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author. 1 Introduction
We study allocation problems of indivisible goods among two agents when monetary compensation is im-
possible or not customary. Such problems are frequent. Think of family members who must allocate goods
inherited from relatives (as handkerchiefs, chairs, tools...) among themselves, managers who must assign
tasks or responsibilities among the direction board of their ﬁrm, or city councils that must share time blocks
between users of a facility. Agents may get more than one good. Preferences over subsets of goods are strict
and additively separable. Goods are desirable.
Our approach is axiomatic. The objective is to identify allocation rules, i.e. mappings that systematically
give one allocations, satisfying (Pareto-)eﬃciency and axioms embodying fairness fundamentals. Agents’
names should not matter. No agent should prefer another’s bundle to her own. One should secure a minimal
welfare level to each agent. As the consumption of each good is private, diﬀerences in preferences may
generate welfare surplus. The less similar another’s preferences are, the weakly better oﬀ an agent should
be, hence the more similar another’s preferences are, the weakly worse oﬀ she should be.
We prove that there is such a rule. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, together with one of
its subcorrespondences, that is desirable according to each fairness property and that does not discriminate
between goods.
To reach our objective, we use anonymity embodying the ﬁrst fairness property and we introduce three
axioms embodying the other three fairness properties resp. First is conditional no-envy, i.e. if possible and
not contradicting eﬃciency, a rule should select envy-free allocations. Second is the unanimity bound, i.e.
each agent should ﬁnd her bundle at least as good as to the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency and
minimization of inequality among equals recommend when each other agent has her preferences. Third is
preference-monotonicity, i.e. if an agent’s preferences change such that she now disagrees with another on at
least one pair of subsets in addition to those they previously disagreed on, the latter should not ﬁnd herself
worse oﬀ on average.
We identify this rule. For each problem, the maximin rule maximizes, across allocations, the minimal
rank, across agents, of an allocation, where the rank of an agent’s bundle is its position in her preferences,
from worst to best of all subsets. This rule embodies the fairness fundamental according to which one should
ﬁrst care for the least fortunates. As it uses ordinal information on preferences over subsets, it does not
assume speciﬁc real-valued functions representing preferences nor welfare comparability, and it takes each
good it allocates into account. Further, as there is a procedure such that an allocation is a solution of it if
and only if it is an allocation the maximin rule selects (Herreiner and Puppe, 2002), one easily applies it.1
The literature on fair allocation problems of possibly several indivisible goods per agents without mon-
etary compensation studies two of these fairness fundamentals, namely avoiding envy and caring for the
least fortunates (Brams and Fishburn, 2000; Edelman and Fishburn, 2001; Brams et al., 2003; Brams and
King, 2005). It gives an in-depth study of necessary and suﬃcient for envy-free, and eﬃcient and envy-free
allocations to be, and an estimation of the likelihood of such allocations. If e.g. agents have the same most
preferred good and prefer it to the subset containing all other goods, no allocation is envy-free. Thus, it
is best to study other fairness fundamentals. The literature studies the existence of allocations in which
one cares for the least fortunates, and of eﬃcient and/or envy-free such allocations. Further, it gives pro-
cedures, in particular yielding envy-free allocations if they exist (also Herreiner and Puppe, 2002; Brams
et al., 2009). Existence and compatibility depend on the number of agents, from two to more, number of
goods, and preferences. We detail results and relate them to ours in the Concluding Comments.2 Besides,
the literature studies solidarity properties w.r.t. changes in the set of goods, agents, or in preferences (Klaus
and Miyagawa, 2001; Elhers and Klaus, 2003). They may impose selecting allocations that are not eﬃcient
nor envy-free even if these exist.
The literature is mute regarding fairness fundamentals we impose, namely those the unanimity bound
and preference-monotonicity embody. The former is frequent in classical problems and those with both
perfectly divisible and indivisible goods (Steinhaus, 1948; Moulin, 1990a/b, 1991, 1992; Beviá, 1996). The
latter appears in problems with public goods (Sprumont, 1993). Yet, their formulation crucially depends
on the problem one studies. Further, though avoiding envy or caring for the least fortunates appear as the
properties one ﬁrst and foremost associates with fairness in such problems, there is no axiomatic study ofthese properties nor, obvious from supra, of lower bounds or monotonicity w.r.t changes in preferences.
The main lesson we draw from our study is as follows. The possible non-existence of envy-free allocations
urges to study other fairness fundamentals. The literature focuses on caring for the least fortunates. Other
such fundamentals are as essential. In particular, agents’ names should not matter, one should secure each
agent with a minimal welfare level, and appropriately share welfare surplus due to diﬀerences in preferences.
These fundamentals, together with avoiding envy, induce one to care for the least fortunates.
We explicitly study two-agent problems. Indeed, there is a clear gap between these and those with more
than two. In the former case, not in the latter, if envy-free allocations exist, at least one is eﬃcient. In the
former case, one may explicitly identify the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency and minimization of
inequality among equals recommend when each other agent has her preferences, hence precisely determine
the minimal welfare level the unanimity bound secures to each agent. In the latter case, the maximin rule
violates eﬃciency and as each of its subcorrespondences, conditional no-envy. This clear gap leads one to
regard two-agent problems and those with more than two as diﬀerent, with diﬀerent problems calling for
diﬀerent solutions. We leave the question of identify desirable rules for problems with more than two agents,
for further research. Yet, we give hints and conjectures.
We end this section with an example. Two siblings inherit from a relative. They have to share an
aquarium, a book, and a coat. Both prefer the aquarium to the book, and the book to the coat. Fairness
considerations intuitively lead to the following conclusion. Each should get at least one good. If one gets the
aquarium, the other should get the book. Possibly, in addition to the book, she should get the coat. If both
prefer the aquarium to the book and the coat together or vice versa, one could allocate these bundles either
way. Yet, if one prefers the aquarium to the book and the coat together and the other prefers the book
and the coat together to the aquarium, eﬃciency requires to allocate these bundles accordingly. To design
rules satisfying eﬃciency and axioms embodying fairness fundamentals, one must consider preferences over
subsets of goods rather than only over goods.3
In Sect. 2, we formally introduce the model. In Sect. 3, we deﬁne the axioms we impose on rules. In
Sect. 4, we prove the maximin rule is desirable, if not the only one. In Sect. 5, we study the gap between
two-agent problems and those with more than two. We formulate the deﬁnitions of Sect. 1 and 2 for each
set of agents, possibly with more than two elements. Doing so, the axioms we introduce, extend to these
problems.
2 Model
There is a non-empty and ﬁnite set of indivisible goods A to allocate among a set of agents N with #A >
#N = 2.4 Each agent i 2 N has a complete and transitive preference relation Ri over the set of all subsets of
goods S. Let Pi and Ii be the strict preference and indiﬀerence relation associated with Ri resp. We assume
desirability, i.e. for each  2 A, we have fg Ri ;; additive separability, i.e. there is a real-valued function





and only if S Ri T; and strictness, i.e. for each S;T 2 S with S 6= T, we have S Pi T or T Pi S.
Let R be the set of all preferences and RN  i2NR the set of all preference proﬁles. We do not
study eﬀects of changes in the set of goods nor agents. For simplicity, an economy is a preference proﬁle
R  (Ri)i2N 2 RN. For each R 2 RN and each i 2 N, let R i  (Rj)j2Nni 2 RNni be the preference
proﬁle of all agents but i w.r.t. R and Ri  (Ri;:::;Ri) 2 RN the unanimity preference proﬁle of i w.r.t. R.
An allocation x  (xi)i2N is a list of bundles with [i2Nxi  A, [i2Nxi 6= ;, and for each i;j 2 N, if
i 6= j, then xi \ xj = ;. Let X be the set of all allocations. An (allocation) rule  is a correspondence
associating with each economy R 2 RN, a non-empty set of allocations (R)  X.
For each i 2 N and each Ri 2 R, we formalize the rank she associates to each subset, from worst
to best, w.r.t. Ri, with the bijection r(:;Ri) : S $ f1;:::;2#Ag such that for each S;T 2 S, we have
r(S;Ri) > r(T;Ri) if and only if S Pi T. We gather and illustrate properties of such a bijection in the next
lemma and example resp.5
Before, we introduce notational shortcuts. Let #A  a, #N  n, for each S 2 S, let #S  s and



















i;j 2 N, let ij  fi;jg. For each i 2 N and each S 2 S, for Ri 2 R, let ri(S)  r(S;Ri); for R0
i 2 R, let
r0
i(S)  r(S;R0
i); and so on.
Lemma 1 For each i 2 N and each Ri 2 R,
 ri(A) = 2a;
 ri(;) = 1;
 For each S 2 S, we have ri(S) + ri(Sc) = 2a + 1;
 For each S;T 2 S, we have ri(S) > ri(T) if and only if ri(Sc) < ri(Tc).
Ex. 1 Let 1, 2, , ,  denote the siblings, aquarium, book, and coat of the Introduction resp. Then, N = 12,
A = , and R1;R2 2 R are as in Fig. 1. There is one row for each subset, one column for each
sibling. The 1st column gives the rank each sibling associates to each subset. One’s way to rank subsets
does not depend on the other’s. E.g. 1 ranks  as her 5th least preferred subset and 2 ranks it 4th,
i.e. r1() = 5 and r2() = 4. By Lem. 1, r1() > r2() if and only if r1() < r2().
3 Axioms
We now deﬁne the axioms we impose on rules. Let  be a rule.
Eﬃciency is standard. There should be no allocation that each agent ﬁnds at least as good as a selected
allocation and at least one agent prefers. Allocation x 2 X is (Pareto-)eﬃcient for R 2 RN if there is no
y 2 X with for each i 2 N, we have yi Ri xi and for at least one i 2 N, we have yi Pi xi. By desirability,
for each R 2 RN and each x 2 X, we have x is eﬃcient for R if and only if there is no free disposal, i.e.
[i2Nxi = A. For each R 2 RN, let P(R) be the set of all eﬃcient allocations for R.
(Pareto-)eﬃciency: For each R 2 RN, we have (R)  P(R).
Fairness is as follows. First, agents’ names should not matter. If one permute agents’ preferences, one
should permute the selected bundles accordingly. Let G be the set of all permutations on N.
Anonymity: For each R 2 RN, each x 2 (R), and each g 2 G, we have (xg(i))i2N 2 ((Rg(i))i2N).
Second, no agent should prefer another’s bundle to her own. Allocation x 2 X is envy-free for R 2 RN
if there is no i 2 N with for j 2 N, if j 6= i, then xj Pi xi. For each R 2 RN, let F(R) be the set of all
envy-free allocations for R and PF(R)  P(R) \ F(R) the set of all eﬃcient allocations for R of this set.
If e.g. agents have the same most preferred good and prefer it to the subset containing all other goods, no
3allocation is envy-free.6 If such an allocation exists, it need not be eﬃcient. We introduce a weaker notion
of no-envy. If possible and not contradicting eﬃciency, a rule should select envy-free allocations.
Conditional no-envy: For each R 2 RN with PF(R) 6= ;, we have (R)  F(R).
Third, one should secure a minimal welfare level to each agent. This level should be as high as possible.
Also, it should be decentralized, in the sense, it should only depend on the feasibility constraints of the
economy and on the agent’s own characteristics. To formalize this idea, consider what follows (Moulin,
1990a/b, 1991, 1992).
Ex. 1 (cont.) Consumption of each good is private. The more 2 diﬀers from 1, the more welfare may one
simultaneously secure for each of the two. Thus, 1 should ﬁnd herself at least as good as when 2 has
her preferences. Assume this is the case, i.e. consider (R1;R1) 2 RN. One should select eﬃcient
allocations treating these agents with equal preferences equally. As each good is indivisible and each
agent has strict preferences, it is impossible to allocate all goods giving these equal agents equal bundles
or bundles they ﬁnd indiﬀerent. To treat them as equally as possible, one should allocate all goods
minimizing how unequal bundles are, maximizing how well oﬀ the envier is. There are the allocations
consisting of bundles  and . The worst bundle of such an allocation according to R1 is . Thus, in
(R1;R2), one should select allocations such that 1 ﬁnds her bundle at least as good as . By the same
logic, in (R1;R2), agent 2 should ﬁnd her bundle at least as good as . E.g. there is (;) 2 X
with  R1  and  R2 .
We require each agent to ﬁnd her bundle at least as good as to the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency
and minimization of inequality among equals recommend when each other agent has her preferences. For each
i 2 N, we formalize the maximal minimal rank across X and N resp. for a unanimity proﬁle w.r.t. i with
the function  r(:;i) : RN ! f1;::::;2ag such that for each R 2 RN, we have  r(R;i)  maxx2X minj2N ri(xj).
This rank only depends on the feasibility constraints of the economy which a preference proﬁle characterizes
and on i’s own preferences, not on others’ preferences. To emphasize this, we use the following notational
shortcut. For each R 2 RN and each i 2 N, let  r(Ri)   r(R;i). (As in R, feasibility constraints are
implicit in Ri.) Allocation x 2 X meets the unanimity bound for R 2 RN if for each i 2 N, we have
ri(xi)   r(Ri). For each R 2 RN, let B(R) be the set of all allocations meeting the unanimity bound for R
and PB(R)  P(R) \ B(R) the set of all eﬃcient allocations for R of this set.
Unanimity bound: For each R 2 RN, we have (R)  B(R).
This axiom secures each agent with a minimal welfare level that is the highest and decentralized. As it sets
this level in terms of welfare associated to a subset of goods, it applies to economies without compensating
means. As it measures this level in terms of ranks, it only requires ordinal information on preferences. As it
requires a minimal welfare level, it is compatible with eﬃciency.
Fourth, as consumption of each good is private, diﬀerences in preferences may generate welfare surplus.
The less similar another’s preferences are, the weakly better oﬀ an agent should be, hence the more similar
another’s preferences are, the weakly worse oﬀ she should be. To formalize this idea, consider what follows.







2 2 R be as in Fig. 2. As 1 and 2 disagree in (R0
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1;R^
2) (e.g.  and 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2 not more similar to R0
1 than
R^
2. As 1 and 2 disagree in (R0
1;R^
2) on pairs of subsets they agree on in (R0
1;R
2) (e.g.  and ),
one should say R^




2 are incomparable w.r.t. R0
1.
Conversely, as 1 and 2 agree in (R0
1;R
+
2 ) on two pairs of subsets in addition to those they agree on in
(R0
1;R^
2) ( and ,  and ), one should say R
+
2 more similar to R0
1 than R^
2.
For each i;j 2 N and each Ri;R0
j;R
j 2 R, say R
j closer to Ri than R0
j if i and j agree in (Ri;R
j)
on at least one pair of subsets in addition to those they agree on in (Ri;R0
j), i.e. fS;T 2 S : S Ri T and
S R
j Tg ) fS;T 2 S : S Ri T and S R0
j Tg. In Ex. 1, R
+
2 is closer to R0
1 than R^
2. Also, R
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Ex. 1 (cont.) Assume (R0
1;R2) = f(;);(;)g and (R0
1;R
2) = f(;);(;
);(;)g. Then, R2 closer to R1 than R
2. To ascertain if the closer 2’s preferences are to 1’s,
the weakly worse oﬀ 1 is, one compares non-empty sets of allocations. Preferences are deﬁned on the
set of subsets of goods. It is not immediate how preferences on the set of non-empty sets of subsets of
goods, hence bundles and a fortiori allocations, relate to them. E.g. 1 prefers  to  or , and 
or  to .
Selecting a multi-valued set of allocations is a ﬁrst step. By deﬁnition, the allocations it contains are
mutually exclusive. In ﬁne, only one materializes. The outcome of such a comparison depends on the
agent’s predictions regarding how, if the rule produces such a tie, it is broken, and on her feeling toward
the uncertainty such a context involves. We assume, given the fairness considerations guiding our study,
the tiebreaker is an even-chance random device, each agent knows it, and each agent is an expected utility
maximizer. Let U be the set of all u : A[; ! R with for some i 2 N and Ri 2 R, we have u ﬁtting Ri. For
each i 2 N, each u 2 U, and each non-empty Y  X, let E(Y;u) 
P
x2Y y 1u(xi) be i’s expected utility of
Y w.r.t. u. Then, for each i 2 N, each Ri 2 R, each u 2 U ﬁtting Ri, and each non-empty Y;Z  X, agent
i ﬁnds Y at least as good as Z if and only if E(Y;u)  E(Z;u).
One knows each agent’s preferences on the set of subsets of goods, not her expected utility of each set of
subsets of goods w.r.t. a real-valued function ﬁtting her preferences. We require each agent’s expected utility
of the selected set of allocations to always be at least equal to the one of the selected set of allocations for each
proﬁle consisting of her preferences and another’s preferences closer to hers. For each R 2 RN, each i;j 2 N
with i 6= j, each R0
j 2 R closer to Ri than Rj, and each u 2 U ﬁtting Ri, we have E((Rj;R j);u) 
E((R0
j;R j);u). This holds if and only if according to her preferences, the selected set of allocations
ﬁrst-stochastically dominates the set of allocations selected for each such proﬁle (Fishburn, 1964).
Preference-monotonicity: For each R 2 RN, each i;j 2 N with i 6= j, each R0
j 2 R closer to Ri than









Let us come back on the deﬁnition of closer. Let   fu 2 RA
+ :
P
2A u = 1g be the (a 1)-dimensional
simplex. Identifying each vertex as a good, each point in  gives a ranking of the subsets of goods according
to how it is sited w.r.t. each vertex. We may represent each preferences as such a point. (Not conversely:
Points in separating hyperplanes gives relations admitting indiﬀerences.) Separating hyperplanes deﬁne
polyhedrons with all points in their interior ﬁtting the same preferences. For each S;T 2 S with S \ T = ;,





2T ug be the separating hyperplane between S and T.
E.g. we may depict each three-good economy, in particular those of Ex. 1, in an equilateral triangle as in
Fig. 3. We identify the top, left, right vertex as , , and  resp. Point u 2  is such that u > u, u > u,















i.e. u()  u, u()  u, and u()  u, ﬁts R1. As each point in the interior of the smallest triangle
including u is sited as u w.r.t. each separating hyperplane, the real-valued function associated with each
such point, also ﬁts R1. The real-valued function associated with each point in the interior of the smallest









This geometric representation leads to the following reformulation. For each i;j 2 N and each
Ri;R0
j;R
j 2 R, we have R
j closer to Ri than R0
j if and only if there are u;u0;u 2  with the associ-
ated real-valued function ﬁtting Ri, R0
j, and R
j resp. and the set of hyperplanes between u and u properly
included in the one between u0 and u. The diﬀerence between R0
j and R
j w.r.t. Ri is a list of consecutive
hyperplanes, i.e. a list of consecutive switches between adjacent bundles. Thus, there is a list of preferences
starting with R0
j, ending with R
j, and with each closer to Ri than the preceding one due to switches between
adjacent bundles. In Ex. 1, for R
2 closer to R0
1 than R




Lemma 2 For each i;j 2 N, each Ri;R0
j;R
j 2 R with R
j closer to Ri than R0
j, there are q 2 N and
(R
q





j, and for each q 2 f2;:::;qg,
 R
q
j closer to Ri than R
q 1
j ;






j (S) < r
q 1
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q 1













j (T)   r
q 1
j (S) = 1.
4 Results
We now identify a rule satisfying the axioms we impose. Further, we prove that if there are three goods,
it is the only rule, with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying the fairness axioms we impose and not
discriminating between goods.
This rule embodies the fairness fundamental according to which one should ﬁrst care for the least for-
tunates. For each preference proﬁle, it selects the allocations maximizing, across allocations, the minimal
rank, across agents, of an allocation.
Maximin rule  : For each R 2 RN, we have  (R) = argmaxx2X mini2N ri(xi).
It has subcorrespondences based on two distinct ideas. First, conditional on caring the least fortunates,
if avoiding envy is impossible, the agents should have equal chance of being the enviee; if not, one should
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the maximin rule selects; if not, it selects, among these allocations, those minimizing, across allocations, the
maximal rank, across agents. Second, one should care for the least fortunates recursively. For each preference
proﬁle, it selects, among the allocations the maximin rule selects, those maximizing, across allocations, the
minimal rank, across agents, whose rank is not the minimal rank of an allocation the maximin rule selects.
The maximin rule and these subcorrespondences embody such ideas, using only ordinal information on
preferences.
We deﬁne these subcorrespondences for two-agent economies. Doing so, we underline the dual aspect of
these, speciﬁc to such economies. The next example illustrates it. We discuss their deﬁnitions for those with
more than two agents in the next section.
Maximin-minimax rule : For each R 2 RN, if PF(R) = ;, then (R) =  (R); if not, (R) =
argminx2 (R) maxi2N ri(Ri).
Leximin rule : For each R 2 RN, we have (R) =
argmaxx2 (R) mini2Nnfj2N: there is y2 (R) with rj(yj)=mink2N rk(yk)g ri(xi).










2) resp. There is one row for each rule, one column for each proﬁle.
To come to our main results, we distinguish rules not discriminating between goods. If all agents reverse
their preferences over a pair of goods, one should permute the selected allocations accordingly. Let H be
the set of all permutations on A. For each h 2 H, each i 2 N, and Ri 2 R, let h(Ri) 2 R with for each
S;T 2 S, we have [2Sh() h(Ri) [2Th() if and only if S Ri T. Let  be a rule.
Neutrality: For each R 2 RN, each x 2 (R), and each h 2 H, we have (h(xi))i2N 2 ((h(Ri))i2N).
Further, we prove properties pertaining to our axioms.
Theorem 1
1. If envy-free allocations exist, eﬃcient and envy-free allocations exist.
2. Independently of an agent’s preferences, the rank of the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency and
minimization of inequality among equals recommend when each other agent has her preferences, equals
2a 1.
Proof. Let N = 12.
Stmt. 1 [For each R 2 RN, if F(R) 6= ;, then PF(R) 6= ;.] Let R 2 RN and x 2 F(R) with x = 2 P(R). By
strictness, there is y 2 P(R) with (i) y1 P1 x1 and y2 P2 x2. As x 2 F(R), we have x1 R1 x2 and




2. As n = 2, we have xc
1 = x2, yc
1 = y2, xc
2 = x1,
and yc
2 = y1. By (i), y1 P1 y2 and y2 P2 y1. Thus, y 2 PF(R).
Stmt. 2 [For each R 2 RN and each i 2 N, we have  r(Ri) = 2a 1.] Let R 2 RN, i 2 N, and for j 2 Nni, let
R0
j 2 R with R0
j = Ri. W.l.o.g. assume i = 1. By 1: and 2:,  r(R1) = 2a 1.
71: [There is x 2 X with r0
2(x2)  2a 1 and r1(x1)  2a 1.] Let x 2 X with r0
2(x2) = 2a 1. By
Lem. 1, r0
2(xc
2) = 2a 1 + 1. As n = 2, we have xc
2 = x1. As R0
2 = R1, we have r1(x1) > 2a 1.
2: [For each x 2 X, if r0
2(x2)  2a 1+1, then r1(x1) < 2a 1+1.] Let x 2 X with r0
2(x2)  2a 1+1.
By Lem. 1, r0
2(xc
2)  2a 1. As n = 2, we have xc
2 = x1. As R0
2 = R1, we have r1(x1) < 2a 1 +1.
We are now ready to state and prove our main result. The maximin rule satisﬁes each axiom we impose.
If there are three goods, it is the only rule, with the maximin-minimax rule, satisfying each fairness axiom
and neutrality.
Theorem 2
1. The maximin rule satisﬁes eﬃciency, anonymity, conditional no-envy, the unanimity bound, and
preference-monotonicity.
2. In three-good economies, a rule satisﬁes anonymity, conditional no-envy, the unanimity bound,
preference-monotonicity, and neutrality if and only if it is the maximin or maximin-minimax rule.
Proof. Let N = 12. For each x 2 X and each R 2 RN, let r(x;R)  mini2N ri(xi) be the minimal rank
of x across N w.r.t. R and r(x;R)  maxi2N ri(xi) the maximal rank of x across N w.r.t. R. We use the
following notational shortcut. Let  be a rule and x 2 X. For each R 2 RN, we have r(;R)  r(x;R) if
and only if x 2 (R).
Stmt. 1  Eﬃciency. By contradiction, assume there are R 2 RN and x 2  (R) with x = 2 P(R). By strictness,
as n = 2, there is y 2 X with for each i 2 N, we have ri(yi) > ri(xi). Thus, r(y;R) > r(x;R),
contradicting x 2  (R).
 Anonymity. As   never uses agents’ names, it satisﬁes anonymity.
 Conditional no-envy. By contradiction, assume there are R 2 RN, x 2 F(R), and y 2  (R) with
y = 2 F(R). W.l.o.g. assume r(x;R) = r1(x1). For each i;j 2 N with i 6= j,
 By deﬁnition, ri(yi)  r(y;R). As y 2  (R), we have r(y;R)  r(x;R). By assumption,
r(x;R) = r1(x1). Thus, (i) ri(yi)  r1(x1).
 As x 2 F(R), we have r1(x1)  r1(x2). By strictness (ii) r1(x1) > r1(x2).
 By (i) and Lem. 1, ri(yc
i)  r1(xc
1). As n = 2, we have yc
i = yj and xc
1 = x2. Thus, (iii)
r1(x2)  ri(yj).
By (i), (ii), and (iii), r1(y1) > r1(y2) and r2(y2) > r2(y1), contradicting y = 2 F(R).
 Unanimity bound. By contradiction, assume there are R 2 RN, x 2  (R), and i 2 N with
ri(xi) <  r(Ri). By Th. 1, ri(xi) < 2a 1 and there is y 2 X with for each j 2 N, we have rj(yj)  2a 1.
By deﬁnition, r(x;R)  ri(xi). Thus, r(x;R) < r(y;R), contradicting x 2  (R).
 Preference-monotonicity. By contradiction, assume there are R 2 RN, R0
2 2 R with R0
2 closer
to R1 than R2, and u 2 U ﬁtting R1 with E( (R);u) < E( (R1;R0
2);u). There are q 2 N and
(R
q
2)q2f1;:::;qg 2 Rf1;:::;qg with
 By Lem. 2, R1
2 = R2, R
q
2 = R0
2, and for each q 2 f2;:::;qg, we have R
q
2 closer to R1 than R
q 1
2 and






2 (S) < r
q 1
2 (T) if and only if r
q 1













2 (T)   r
q 1
2 (S) = 1;
 There is q 2 f2;:::;qg with E( (R1;R
q 1
2 );u) < E( (R1;R
q
2);u).
W.l.o.g. assume q = 2. Let R0 2 RN with R0 = (R1;R0
2). As E( (R);u) < E( (R0);u), there are
x 2  (R) and y 2  (R0) with y1 P1 x1.
1: [r(y;R) = r2(y2).] By assumption, r1(y1) > r1(x1). By deﬁnition, r1(x1)  r(x;R). As x 2
 (R), we have r(x;R)  r(y;R). Thus, r1(y1) > r(y;R), implying r(y;R) = r2(y2).
82: [r(x;R0) = r1(x1).] By contradiction, assume r(x;R0) 6= r1(x1).
 By assumption, r1(y1) > r1(x1). By Lem. 1, r1(yc
1) < r1(xc
1). As n = 2, we have yc
1 = y2 and
xc
1 = x2. Thus, (i) r1(x2) > r1(y2).
 By deﬁnition, r2(x2)  r(x;R)). As x 2  (R), we have r(x;R)  r(y;R). By 1:, r(y;R) =
r2(y2). By strictness, as x 6= y, (ii) r2(x2) > r2(y2).
By assumption, r(x;R0) = r0
2(x2). As R0
2 closer to R1 than R2, and (i) and (ii) hold, r0
2(x2) >
r0
2(y2). By deﬁnition, r0
2(y2)  r(y;R0). Thus, r(x;R0) > r(y;R0), contradicting y 2  (R0).
3: [r2(y2) < r0
2(y2).] By contradiction, assume r2(y2)  r0
2(y2). As y 2  (R0), we have r(y;R0) 
r(x;R0). By 2:, r(x;R0) = r1(x1). By deﬁnition, r1(x1)  r(x;R). As x 2  (R), we have
r(x;R)  r(y;R). By 1:, r(y;R) = r2(y2). By assumption, r2(y2)  r0
2(y2). By deﬁnition,
r0
2(y2)  r(y;R0). Thus, r(y;R0) = r(x;R0) = r(x;R) = r(y;R). By deﬁnition, # (R) 2
f1;:::;ng. As n = 2, x 6= y, x 2  (R) and y 2  (R0), we have  (R) =  (R0) = fx;yg,
contradicting E( (R);u) < E( (R0);u).
4: [Contradiction.]
 By 3:, r2(y2) < r0
2(y2). As q = 2, (i) there is z 2 X with r2(z2) = r0
2(y2), r2(y2) = r0
2(z2),




2 is closer to R1 than R2, we have r1(z2) < r1(y2). By Lem. 1, r1(zc
2) > r1(yc
2). As
n = 2, we have zc
2 = z1 and yc
2 = y1. Thus, (ii) r1(z1) > r1(y1).
 By (ii), r1(z1) > r1(y1). By assumption, r1(y1) > r1(x1). By deﬁnition, r1(x1)  r(x;R). As
x 2  (R), we have r(x;R)  r(z;R). Thus, r1(z1) > r(z;R), implying (iii) r(z;R) = r2(z2).
By 2:, r(x;R0) = r1(x1). By deﬁnition, r1(x1)  r(x;R). As x 2  (R), we have r(x;R) 
r(z;R). By (iii), r(z;R) = r2(z2). By (i), r2(z2) = r0
2(y2). By deﬁnition, r0
2(y2)  r(y;R0).
As y 2  (R0), we have r(y;R0)  r(x;R0). Thus, r(x;R0) = r(x;R) = r(z;R) = r(y;R0).
By deﬁnition, # (R) 2 f1;:::;ng. As n = 2, x 6= y 6= z, x 2  (R) and y 2  (R0), we have
 (R) = fx;zg and  (R0) = fx;yg. By (ii), E( (R);u) > E( (R0);u).
Stmt. 2  The maximin and maximin-minimax rules satisfy the axioms of Th. 2.2. By Th. 2.1,   satisﬁes the
fairness axioms. As it never uses names of goods, it satisﬁes neutrality. As  never uses names of
agents nor of goods, it satisﬁes anonymity and neutrality. As it is a subcorrespondence of  , it satisﬁes
conditional no-envy and the unanimity bound. Let a = 3. Then, it satisﬁes preference-monotonicity:
The proof of Th. 2.1 holds for , considering the cases where  may diﬀer from  .
3: [r2(y2) < r0
2(y2).] (cont.) We have r(x;R) = r(y;R) = r(x;R0) = r(y;R0), hence (...),  (R) =
 (R0) = fx;yg. W.l.o.g. assume (R) 6=  (R), (R0) 6=  (R0), or both.
 By 1:, r(y;R) = r2(y2). By 2:, r(x;R0) = r1(x1). As r(y;R) = r(x;R), r(x;R0) = r(y;R0),
n = 2, and x 6= y, (i) r(x;R) = r1(x1) and r(y;R0) = r0
2(y2).
 Assume r( ;R) = 2a 1. As r( ;R) = r( ;R0), we have r( ;R0) = 2a 1. As x 2  (R),
y 2  (R0), and (i) holds, r1(x1) = r0
2(y2) = 2a 1. By Lem. 1, r1(xc
1) = r0
2(y2) = 2a 1 +1. As
n = 2, we have xc
1 = x2 and yc
2 = y1. Thus, r1(x2) = r0
2(y1) = 2a 1+1. Thus, r1(x1) < r1(x2)
and r0
2(y2) < r0
2(y1). As x 2  (R) and y 2  (R0), and   satisﬁes eﬃciency and conditional
no-envy, PF(R) = PF(R0) = ;, contradicting (R) 6=  (R), (R0) 6=  (R0), or both. Thus,
r( ;R) 6= 2a 1. By Th. 1.2 and 2.1, r( ;R)  2a 1 + 1. As r( ;R) = r( ;R0), we have
r( ;R0)  2a 1 + 1. As x 2  (R), y 2  (R0), and (i) holds, r1(x1) = r0
2(y2)  2a 1 + 1. By
Lem. 1, r1(xc
1) = r0
2(y2)  2a 1. As n = 2, we have xc
1 = x2 and yc
2 = y1. Thus, r1(x2) =
r0
2(y1)  2a 1. Thus, r1(x1) > r1(x2) and r0
2(y2) > r0
2(y1). Thus, (ii) PF(R) = PF(R0) 6= ;.
 By (i) and 1:, r(x;R) = r1(x1) and r(y;R) = r2(y2). By (i) and 2:, r(x;R0) = r1(x1) and
r(y;R0) = r0
2(y2). As n = 2 and x 6= y, we have r(x;R) = r2(x2) and r(y;R) = r1(y1),
and r(x;R0) = r0
2(x2) and r(y;R0) = r1(y1). As x 2 (R), y 2 (R0), r(x;R) = r(y;R),
r(x;R0) = r(y;R0), and (R) 6=  (R), (R0) 6=  (R0), or both, and (ii) holds, r(x;R) 
9r(y;R) and r(x;R0)  r(y;R0) with strict inequality for at least one. Thus, (iii) r2(x2) <
r0
2(x2).
As s = 2 and (iii) holds, there is z 2 X with r2(z2) > r2(x2), r0
2(z2) < r0
2(x2), r2(z2) = r2(x2)+1,
r0
2(z2) = r2(x2), and r0
2(x2) = r2(z2). As x 2 (R), we have r1(z1) < r1(x1). By Lem. 1,
r1(zc
1) > r1(xc
1). As n = 2, we have zc
1 = z2 and xc
1 = x2. Thus, r1(z2) > r1(x2). By assumption,
r2(z2) > r2(x2) and r0
2(z2) < r0
2(x2), contradicting R0
2 closer to R1 than R2.
4: [Contradiction.] (cont.) We have r(x;R) = r(z;R) = r(x;R0) = r(y;R0), hence (...),  (R) =
fx;zg and  (R0) = fx;yg. W.l.o.g. assume (R) 6=  (R), (R0) 6=  (R0), or both.
 By (iii), r(z;R) = r2(z2). As r(z;R) = r(x;R) and n = 2, r(x;R) = r1(x1). Thus, (iv)
r1(x1) = r2(z2).
 Assume r2(z2) = 2a 1 + 1. By Lem. 1, r2(zc
2) = 2a 1. As n = 2, we have zc
2 = z1. Thus,
(v) r2(z1) = 2a 1. By (i), r2(z2)   r2(y2) = 1. By assumption, r2(z2) = 2a 1 + 1. Thus,
r2(y2) = 2a 1. By (v), r2(y2) = r2(z1). By strictness, (vi) y2 = z1. By assumption, r1(y1) >
r1(x1). By (iv), r1(x1) = r2(z2). By assumption, r2(z2) = 2a 1 +1. Thus, r1(y1) > 2a 1 +1.
By Lem. 1, r1(yc
1) < 2a 1. As n = 2, we have yc
1 = y2. Thus, r1(y2) < 2a 1. By (vi),
r1(z1) < 2a 1. By assumption, r2(z2) = 2a 1 + 1. Thus, r1(z1) < r2(z2), contradicting (iii).
Thus, (vii) r2(z2) 6= 2a 1 + 1.
As z 2  (R), by Th. 1 and 2.1, r(z;R)  2a 1. As a = 3, we have r(z;R)  2a 1 + 1. By
(iii), (iv), and (vii), r1(x1) = 2a 1. By Lem. 1, r1(xc
1) = 2a 1 + 1. As n = 2, we have xc
1 = x2.
Thus, r1(x2) = 2a 1 + 1. Thus, r1(x1) < r1(x2). As x 2  (R) \  (R0) and   satisﬁes eﬃciency
and conditional no-envy, PF(R) = PF(R0) = ;, contradicting (R) 6=  (R), (R0) 6=  (R0), or
both.
 A rule satisfying the axioms of Th. 2.2 is the maximin or maximin-minimax rule. Let  be a rule
satisfying these axioms. Let A =  and R 2 RN.
1: [(R)   (R).] By contradiction, assume there is x 2 (R) with x = 2  (R). Let y 2  (R).
 As x = 2  (R) and y 2  (R), we have r(x;R) < r(y;R). As x 2 (R) and  satisﬁes the
unanimity bound, by Th. 1, r(x;R)  2a 1. As y 2  (R), by Th. 1 and 2.1, r(y;R)  2a 1.
As a = 3, we have r(y;R)  2a 1 + 1. Thus, (i) r(x;R) = 2a 1 and r(y;R) = 2a 1 + 1.
 By deﬁnition, r1(y1)  r(y;R) and r2(y2)  r(y;R). By (i), r(y;R) = 2a 1 + 1. By
Lem. 1, r1(yc
1)  2a 1 and r2(yc
2)  2a 1. As n = 2, we have yc
1 = x2 and yc
2 = x1. Thus,
r1(y2) > r1(y2) and r2(y2) > r2(y1). As y 2  (R) and   satisﬁes eﬃciency and conditional
no-envy, (ii) PF(R) 6= ;.
W.l.o.g. assume r(x;R) = r1(x1). By (i), r1(x1) = 2a 1. By Lem. 1, r1(xc
1) = 2a 1 + 1. As
n = 2, we have xc
1 = x2. Thus, x1(x2) > r1(x1). By (ii), PF(R) 6= ;, contradicting conditional
no-envy.
2: [(R) =  (R) or (R) = (R).] By contradiction, assume (R) 6=  (R) and (R) 6= (R).
By deﬁnition, # (R) 2 f1;:::;ng. As n = 2 and 1: holds, there are x;y 2 X with x 6= y,
(R) = fxg, and  (R) = fx;yg. As x 2  (R), by Th. 1 and 2.1, r(x;R)  2a 1. As a = 3, we
have r(x;R)  2a 1 + 1. W.l.o.g. assume r(x;R) = r1(x1). Distinguish 2 cases.
a : r1(x1) = 2a 1. Let R0
2 2 R with R0
2 = R1. Then, R0
2 is closer to R1 than R2, there is
z 2 X with r1(z1) = 2a 1 + 1 and r0
2(z2) = 2a 1, and B(R1;R0
2) = fx;zg. As  satisﬁes
anonymity and the unanimity bound, (R1;R0
2) = fx;zg. By assumption, r1(x1) = 2a 1
and r1(z1) = 2a 1 + 1. For each u 2 U ﬁtting R1, we have E((R);u) < E((R1;R0
2);u),
contradicting preference-monotonicity.
b : r1(x1) = 2a 1 + 1. As n = 2, a = 3, and # (R) = 2, there are ; 2 A with x = (;A=)
and y = (A=;). W.l.o.g. assume x = (;) and y = (;). As r(x;R) = r1(x1),
r(x;R) = r(y;R), and n = 2, we have r(y;R) = r2(y2). As x 6= y, we have r1(x1) = 2a 1+1,
10r2(x2) > 2a 1 + 1, r1(y1) > 2a 1 + 1, and r2(y2) = 2a 1 + 1. As (R) 6= (R), we have
r1(y1)  r2(x2). Distinguish 2 cases.
b:1 r1(y1) = r2(x2). Let h 2 H with h() =  and h() = . Let R0 2 RN with R0 = h(R). As
(R) = (;) and  satisﬁes neutrality, (R0
1;R0
2) = f(;)g. As r1(y1) = r2(x2) and
a = 3, we have R0 = (R2;R1). Thus, (R2;R1) = f(;)g, contradicting anonymity.
b:2 r1(y1) < r2(x2). Let z1 2 S with r1(z1) = r2(x2). As a = 3, we have r1(y1) = r1(z1)   1.
Let R0
1 2 R with r0
1(y1) = r1(z1), r0
1(z1) = r1(y1) and for each S 2 Snfx1;z1g, we
have r0
1(S) = r1(S). Then, R1 is closer to R2 than R0
1 and B(R0
1;R2) = fx;yg. As
r0
1(y1) = r2(x2), a = 3, and  satisﬁes anonymity, the unanimity bound, and neutrality, by
the logic of the previous paragraph, (R0
1;R2) = fx;yg. By assumption, r2(x2) > 2a 1+1
and r2(y2) = 2a 1+1. For each u 2 U ﬁtting R2, we have E((R);u) > E((R0
1;R2);u),
contradicting preference-monotonicity.
By 2:, (R) =  (R) or (R) = (R). This holds for each R 2 RN. As  satisﬁes neutrality, if
there is R 2 RN with PF(R) 6= ; and (R) = (R), then for each R 2 RN with PF(R) 6= ;, we
have (R) = (R). Thus, for each R 2 RN, we have (R) =  (R), or for each R 2 RN, we have
(R) = (R).
One cannot drop an axiom in Th. 2.2.7 Let  be a rule. Assume there is an ordered list (1;:::;a) of
A with for each R 2 RN, if r( ;R) 6= 2a 1 + 1, then (R) =  (R); if not, (R) = fx 2  (R) : there are
i 2 N with r(xi) = r( ;R) and q 2 f1;:::;ag with q 2 yi, and for each j 2 N with r(xj) = r( ;R) and
each p 2 f1;:::;ag with p < q, we have p 62 xjg. Then,  satisﬁes all axioms but neutrality. Assume for
each R 2 RN, we have (R) = (R). Then,  satisﬁes all axioms but preference-monotonicity. Assume
for each R 2 RN, if PF(R) 6= ;, then (R) =  (R); if not, (R) = f(;;A);(A;;)g. Then,  satisﬁes all
axioms but the unanimity bound. Assume for each R 2 RN, we have (R) = PB(R). Then,  satisﬁes all
axioms but conditional no-envy. Assume there is i 2 N with for each R 2 RN, we have (R) = fx 2  (R) :
for each y 2  (R), we have ri(yi)  ri(xi)g. Then,  satisﬁes all axioms but anonymity.
The intuition for why the maximin rule satisﬁes preference-monotonicity, not the leximin rule, is simple.
Consider Ex. 1. In (R0
1;R^
2), the maximin rule selects (;) and (;). The maximal rank of (;)
is the rank of  w.r.t. R0
1. The one of (;) is the rank of  w.r.t. R^
2. As the latter is one rank
higher than the former, the leximin rule only selects (;). In (R0
1;R
+
2 ), agents 1 and 2 further agree on
 and , hence on  and . To be so,  is one rank lower for R
+
2 than R^
2. The maximal ranks of
(;) and (;) equalize. As their minimal ranks are unchanged, both rules select (;) and (;).
The selections of the maximin rule are the same in both economies. The one of the leximin rule includes
one more allocation in the latter, with this allocation being precisely the one, among the two with minimal
ranks, 1 prefers. Her expected utility is unchanged with the maximin rule and increases with the leximin
rule. It is exactly the diﬀerence between the two rules that makes the former satisfy preference-monotonicity
and the latter not.
If rules diﬀerent from the maximin rule satisfy the axioms we impose in economies with more than three
goods, is an open question. Natural candidates do not.
Ex. 2 Let N = 12, A = , and R1;R2;R0
2;R
2;R^
2 2 R be as in Fig. 5.
 Consider . As it is a subcorrespondence of  , by Th. 2.1, it satisﬁes eﬃciency, conditional
no-envy, and the unanimity bound. As it never uses agents’ names, it satisﬁes anonymity. Yet,
it violates preference-monotonicity: R^




2) = f(;)g, and
(R0
1;R^






 Let  be the rule with for each R 2 RN, if PF(R) = ;, then (R) = PB(R); if not, (R) =
PF(R). (Note that  is a supercorrespondence of   and if a = 3, for each R 2 RN, we have
(R) =  (R).) By deﬁnition, it satisﬁes eﬃciency and conditional no-envy. As it never uses
agents’ names, it satisﬁes anonymity. As n = 2, if an allocation is envy-free, each agent has at
11Figure 5:
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least her 2a 1 + 1th least preferred good, hence it satisﬁes the unanimity bound. Yet, it violates
preference-monotonicity: R0
2 is closer to R1 than R2, (R1;R2) = f(;);(;);(;)g,
and (R1;R0
2) = f(;);(;);(;);(;)g. For u 2 U ﬁtting R1 with u() = 3:4,
u() = 1:1, u() = 1, and u() = 1:2, we have E((R1;R2);u) < E((R1;R0
2);u).
Let us end this section with a remark on preference-monotonicity. Deﬁning it, we have introduced a
notion of (dis-)similarity w.r.t. preferences. We have deemed incomparable those such that a change from
one to the other implies opposite movements, i.e. agreements and disagreements on pairs of subsets of goods.
Assume one instead only focuses on agreements, disregarding the shaky interpretation. For each i;j 2 N
and each Ri;R0
j;R
j 2 R, say R
j weakly closer to Ri than R0
j if i and j agree in (Ri;R
j) on at least one
more pair of subsets than in (Ri;R0
j), i.e. #fS;T 2 S : S Ri T and S R
j Tg > #fS;T 2 S : S Ri T and
S R0
j Tg.8 This notion is weaker, in the sense, if preferences are closer, they are weakly closer, not conversely.
In Ex. 1, R^
2 is weakly closer to R0
1 than R
2. As 1 and 2 disagree in (R0
1;R^
2) on pairs of subsets they agree
on in (R0
1;R
2), it is not closer. This notion implies a stronger monotonicity axiom that the maximin and
maximin-minimax rules violate. Thus, no rule satisﬁes this axiom, the other fairness axioms, and neutrality.
Ex. 1 (cont.) Consider (R1;R^
2) and (R1;R
2). Then, R

















2) = f(;);(;)g, and (R0
1;R^
2) = f(;)g. For u 2 U ﬁtting R0
1 with





5 Two-agent vs. More-than-two-agent economies
We now study the gap between two-agent economies and those with more than two.
In two-agent economies, if envy-free allocations exist, at least one is eﬃcient (Th. 1.1). In economies with
one more good than agents, each envy-free allocation is eﬃcient. Yet, in other economies, even if there are
envy-free allocations, it may be that none is eﬃcient. Further, in two-agent economies, independently of an
12agent’s preferences, the rank of the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency and minimization of inequality
among equals recommend when each other agent has her preferences, equals 2a 1 (Th. 1.2). In economies
with one more good than agents, independently of her preferences, it equals 4. Yet, in other economies, it
may vary along with preferences.
Theorem 3
1. If a = n + 1, each envy-free allocation is eﬃcient. If a > n + 1 and n > 2, there are economies with
envy-free allocations, and no eﬃcient and envy-free allocation.
2. If a = n + 1, independently of an agent’s preferences, the rank of the worst bundle of the allocations
eﬃciency and minimization of inequality among equals recommend when each other agent has her
preferences, equals 4. If a > n + 1 and n > 2, it varies along preferences.
Proof.
Stmt. 1  [If a = n+1, for each R 2 RN, we have F(R)  P(R).] Assume a = n+1 and by contradiction,
there are R 2 RN and x 2 F(R) with x = 2 P(R). There is y 2 P(R) with for each i 2 N, we
have yi Ri xi and there is i 2 N with yi Pi xi. By strictness, for each i 2 N with yi 6= xi, we have
yi Pi xi. As a = n + 1 and by desirability, there is j 2 N with #xj = 2 and for each l 2 Nnj,
we have #xl = 1, and there is k 2 N with #yk = 2 and for each l 2 Nnk, we have #yl = 1.
Distinguish 2 cases.
a : i = j and i 6= k, or i 6= j and i = k. Then, #xj = 2, #yj = 1, and yj Pj xj. By desirability,
xj 6 yj, hence there is l 2 Nnj with xl = yi. Thus, xl Pi xi, contradicting x 2 F(R).
b : i = j and i = k, or i 6= j and i 6= k. There is l 2 N with #xl = 1, #yl = 1, and yl Pl xl, hence
there is m 2 Nnl with xm  yl. By desirability, xm Rl yl. Thus, xm Pl xl, contradicting
x 2 F(R).
 [If a > n + 1 and n > 2, there is R 2 RN with F(R) 6= ; and PF(R) = ;.] Let N = 123,
A = , and R 2 RN be as in Fig. 6. Let x;y 2 X with x = (;;) and y = (;;).
Then, F(R) = fxg. As y1 P1 x1, y2 P2 x2, and y3 I3 x3, we have x = 2 P(R). Thus, PF(R) = ;.
Stmt. 2  [If a = n + 1, for each R 2 RN and each i 2 N, we have  r(Ri) = 4.] Assume a = n + 1. Let
R 2 RN, i 2 N, and for each j 2 Nni, let R0
j 2 R with R0
j = Ri. Let ;; 2 A be i’s 1st,
2nd, and 3rd least preferred good resp., i.e. ri() = 2, ri() = 3, and ri() = 4 if and only if
ri() = 5. W.l.o.g. assume ri() = 4. By 1: and 2:,  r(Ri) = 4.
1: [There is x 2 X with for each j 2 Nni, we have r0
j(xj)  4 and ri(xi)  4.] Let x 2 X with
for each j 2 Nni, we have #xj = 1 and xj 62 f;g, and xi = . As for each j 2 Nni, we
have R0
j = Ri, for each j 2 Nni, we have r0
j(xj)  4, and ri(xi)  4.
2: [For each x 2 X, if for each j 2 Nni, we have r0
j(xj)  5, then ri(xi) < 5.] Let x 2 X
with for each j 2 Nni, we have r0
j(xj)  5. As for each j 2 Nni, we have R0
j = Ri, for each
j 2 Nni, we have xj 62 f;;;;g. As a = n + 1, there are j;k 2 Nni with #xj = #xk = 2
and for each l 2 Nnijk, we have #xl = 1. If j 6= k, then
P
l2Nni #xl = a. Thus, xi = ;. If
j = k, then
P
l2Nni #xl = a   1. As for each l 2 Nnij, we have #xl = 1 and xl 62 f;;g,
we have [l2Nnijxl = An. As xj 62 f;;g, we have xj = . Thus, xi = . In both
cases, ri(xi) < 5.
 [If a > n + 1 and n > 2, there are R;R0 2 RN and i 2 N with  r(Ri) 6=  r(R0
i).] Let N = 123,
A = , and R 2 RN be as in Fig. 6. Then,  r(R1) = 7,  r(R2) = 8, and  r(R3) = 8.
By Th. 1.2 and 3.2, if n = 2, a = n+1, or both, the rank of the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency
and minimization of inequality among equals recommend when each other agent has an agent’s preferences,



































14ﬁnd her bundle at least as good as the subset she ranks: (i) if n = 2, then 2a 1th; (ii) if a = n + 1, then
4th. If n > 2 and a > n + 1, we fear it is not the case. Computational complexity hardens the study of an
axiom.9 Yet, in what follows, we prove that the minimum, across preferences, of this rank has a closed-form
expression. This result gives a necessary condition for unanimity bound, in the sense, the unanimity bound
secures each agent ﬁnds her bundle at least as good as the subset whose rank equals this minimal value, that
avoids such possible complexity.
Theorem 4 Independently of an agent’s preferences, the rank of the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency
and minimization of inequality among equals recommend when each other agent has her preferences, is at




















Proof. [For each R 2 RN and each i 2 N, we have  r(Ri)  r0.] Let R 2 RN, i 2 N,
and for each S 2 S and each q 2 f1;:::;sg, let ^ r(S;Ri;1)  max2Sfri()g, ..., and ^ r(S;Ri;q) 
max2Snf2S: there is p2f1;:::;q 1g with ri()=^ r(S;Ri;p)gfri()g.
Let R
i 2 R be lexicographic w.r.t. Ri, in the sense, for each S;T 2 S, if s 6= t, then S P
i T if and
only if s > t; if not, S P
j T if and only if there is q 2 f1;:::;sg with for each p 2 f1;:::;q   1g, we have
^ r(S;Ri;p)  ^ r(T;Ri;p) with strict inequality for q.
Let S 2 S be non-empty and t0;:::;ts 2 f0;:::;ag with t0 = 0, ^ r(A;R
i;t1) = ^ r(S;R






















W.l.o.g. let A = 1:::a with ri(1) > ::: > ri(a). The 1st term counts all subsets of size 0 to s. To this,
I subtract the 2nd term, i.e. (i) all subsets of size s in which the 1st preferred good in the subset is 1, ...,
t1 1; (ii) all subsets of size s in which the 1st preferred good in the subset is t1 and the 2nd preferred
good in the subset is the t1+1, ..., t2 1; ...

















Let (s;t1) denote this formula. For each j 2 Nni, let R
j 2 R with R
j = R




ne   a). Thus,  r(Ri) = (b a
nc;nd a
ne   a).
1: [There is x 2 X with for each j 2 N, we have r
j(xj)  (b a
nc;nd a
ne a.] Let (i1;:::;in) be an ordered
list of N, q 2 f1;:::;ng, and x 2 X with
 qb a
nc + (n   q)d a
ne = a,
 xiq = fq;:::;q+b a
nc 1g,
 For each q 2 f1;:::;q   1g, we have xiq = fq;q+(q q)b a
nc (q q 1);:::;q+(q q+1)b a
nc (q q+1)g,
 For each q 2 fq   1;:::;ng, we have #xiq = b a
nc + 1.
W.l.o.g. assume iq = i. Then, #xi = b a
nc. Also, t1 = q, t2 = q + 1, ..., ts1 = q + b a
nc   2, and
ts = q + b a
nc   1 implying for each p 2 f2;:::;sg, we have (tp   tp 1) = 1 . Thus, r
i (xi) = (b a
nc;q).
As qb a
nc + (n   q)d a
ne = a, we have q = nd a
ne   a. Thus, r
i (xi) = (b a
nc;nd a
ne   a).
Let q 2 f1;:::;ng. If q < q, then #xiq = b a
nc = #xi and ^ r(xiq;R
iq;1) = ^ r(A;R
iq;q) > ^ r(A;R
i;q) =
^ r(xi;R
i;1). If q > q, then #xiq = b a













152: [Let x 2 X be as in 1: There is no y 2 X with for each j 2 N, we have r
j(yj) > r
i (xi).] By
contradiction, assume there is y 2 X with for each j 2 N, we have r
j(yj) > r
i (xi). For each j 2 N, we
have #yj = b a
nc or #yj = b a
nc+1. As r
i (yi) > r
i (xi), we have #xi < #yi or #xi = #yi. Distinguish
2 cases.
a : #xi < #yi. There is j 2 Nni with #xj = b a
nc + 1 and #yj = b a
nc. If ^ r(yj;Ri;1)  ^ r(A;Ri;q),
then r
j(yj)  (b a
nc;q), contradicting r
j(yj) > r
i (xi). Thus, ^ r(yj;Ri;1) > ^ r(A;Ri;q), hence
there is k 2 Nni with #xk = b a






i (xi). Thus, #yk = b a
nc + 1. Repeating this logic, there is
g 2 G with (xg(l))l2N = y. By 1:, for each l 2 N, we have r
l (yl)  (b a
nc;nd a
ne a) with equality
for l 2 Nni, contradicting r
l (yl) > r
i (xi).
b : #xi = #yi. Thus, ^ r(yi;Ri;1) > ^ r(A;Ri;q), hence there is j 2 Nni with #xj = b a
nc and
^ r(yj;Ri;1) < ^ r(A;Ri;q). If #yj = b a
nc, then r




Thus, #yj = b a
nc + 1. By the logic of Case a:, there is g 2 G with (xg(k))k2N = y. By 1:,
for each k 2 N, we have r
k(yk)  (b a
nc;nd a




The clear gap between two-agent economies and those with more than two leads one to regard them
as diﬀerent. Diﬀerent problems call for diﬀerent solutions. Indeed, by Th. 2, in two-agent economies, the
maximin rule satisﬁes the axioms we impose. In economies with three goods, it is the only rule, with one
of its subcorrespondences, satisfying the fairness axioms we impose and not discriminating between goods.
Yet, in economies with more than two agents, it violates eﬃciency and as each of its subcorrespondences,
conditional no-envy. We prove this in Ex. 3. As there seem to be no other desirable rule in two-agent
economies, an open question is whether this gap implies an incompatibility between eﬃciency, anonymity,
conditional no-envy, the unanimity bound, and preference-monotonicity in those with more than two.
Before, we comment on the deﬁnitions of the maximin-minimax and leximin rules. The extension of the
former to economies with more than two agents is not immediate, in particular if avoiding envy is possible.
Minimizing inequality, e.g. recursively from the agent with the maximal rank and onwards, forces a violation
of eﬃciency. The latter lexicographically applies the maximin rule, in the sense, it ﬁrst selects the allocations
maximizing the minimal rank across agents; among these allocations, it selects the allocations maximizing
the second minimal rank across agents; ...; This is done until no further distinction is possible (e.g. Sen, 1970;
d’Aspremont and Gevers, 1977).10 The dual aspects of these rules illustrate the conﬂict between eﬃciency
and fairness fundamentals that only appears in economies with more than two agents.
Ex. 3 Let N = 123, A = , and R1;R2;R3;R0
3 2 R be as in Fig. 7, and w;x;y;z 2 X with w =
(;;), x = (;;), y = (;;), and z = (;;). First,  (R1;R2;R3) = fw;xg. As
x1 P1 w1, x2 I2 w2, and x3 P3 w3, we have w = 2 P(R1;R2;R3). Thus,  (R1;R2;R3) 6 P(R1;R2;R3).
Second,  (R1;R2;R0
3) = fzg. As z2 P2 z1, we have z = 2 F(R1;R2;R0
3). As y1 P1 y2, y1 P1 y3,
y2 P2 y1, y2 P2 y3, y3 P0
3 y1, and y3 P0
3 y2, we have y 2 F(R1;R2;R0







Our objective was to identify mappings that systematically give one eﬃcient and fair allocations of indivisible
goods among two agents when monetary compensation is impossible or not customary. We have assumed
strict and additively separable preferences over subsets, and desirable goods.
As no large number of goods ever replaces money as a compensating means, the search for eﬃcient and fair
allocations is even harder than when money is available. We have focused on several fairness fundamentals.
Anonymity is classical, in the sense, one studies it much in the literature and its adaptation is straightforward.
As avoiding envy is not always possible, yet sometimes, we have introduced conditional no-envy. As properties
of welfare lower bounds and monotonicity w.r.t. changes in preferences are crucial to judge allocations on the
16Figure 7:
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basis of fairness in each possible economy and as their adaptation is not straightforward, we have introduced
the unanimity bound and preference-monotonicity. The axioms we have introduced, apply to each set of
agents, possibly with more than two elements.
We have reached our objective identifying the maximin rule as a desirable rule. First, it satisﬁes each
axiom we imposed. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying
each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods. If there are more than three goods, it seems to be
among the very few rules satisfying these axioms. Natural subcorrespondences and supercorrespondences,
as the maximin-minimax rule, the leximin rule, the rule selecting for each R 2 RN, each x 2 PB(R), or
the rule selecting for each R 2 RN, if PF(R) = ;, each x 2 PB(R); if not, each x 2 PF(R), violate one of
these properties. Finally, one easily applies it: There is a procedure such that an allocation is a solution of
it if and only if it is an allocation the maximin rule selects (Herreiner and Puppe, 2002).1
The maximin rule embodies the fairness fundamental according to which one should ﬁrst care for the least
fortunates. Other formulations are possible. In particular, balanced divisions maximize, across allocations,
the minimal utility, across agents, of an allocation, equating the agents’ utilities of the subset containing
all goods (Brams and Fishburn, 2000; Edelman and Fishburn, 2001); maxmin divisions or Borda maximin
allocations maximize, across allocations, the minimal sum of points, across agents, of an allocation, where
the point of a good in an agent’s bundle is a, ..., 1 if her most, ..., least preferred of all goods resp. (Brams
et al., 2003; Brams and King, 2005); maximin allocations maximize, across allocations with each agent’s
bundle counting (a=n) only if possible, the minimal rank, across agents, of the list consisting of each agent’s
least preferred good of her bundle in an allocation (Brams and King, 2005).11 As the maximin rule uses
ordinal information on preferences over subsets, it does not assume speciﬁc real-valued functions representing
preferences nor welfare comparability, and it takes each good it allocates into account.
We have explicitly studied two-agent economies. Indeed, there is a clear gap between these and those
with more than two. If there are two agents and both have the same preferences over singletons, the existence
of envy-free allocations implies the one of eﬃcient and envy-free allocations (Brams and Fishburn, 2000).
If there are more than two agents and all have the same preferences over singletons, it is not true. There
are economies with n = 3 and a  9 with envy-free allocations, none of which is eﬃcient (Edelman and
Fishburn, 2001). Intuitively, the less similar the agents’ preferences are, the more envy-free allocations
and the fewer eﬃcient allocations there should be. It is not obvious how the set of envy-free and eﬃcient
17allocations reacts.12 We have proved that for n = 2, if envy-free allocations exist, at least one is eﬃcient,
but there are economies with n = 3 and a = 5 with envy-free allocations, none of which is eﬃcient. Thus,
the implication for n = 2 versus the incompatibility for n > 2 holding under similarity of preferences over
singletons, generalize. We have proved that 5 is the smallest a for there to be such an incompatibility.
For n = 2, if there are allocations with for each preference proﬁle in which the agents keep these preferences
over singletons, these are envy-free allocations, at least one is eﬃcient for at least one such proﬁle; for n > 2,
there are preference proﬁles and allocations with for each preference proﬁle in which the agents keep these
preferences over singletons, these are envy-free allocations and for no such proﬁle, it is eﬃcient (Brams et
al., 2003). This understanding of avoiding envy is stronger, and possible only if there is q 2 N with qn = a.
Though the incompatibility for n > 2 follows from it, this statement says nothing on the implication for
n = 2, and the number of goods in the example proving it, need not be be the smallest for there to be
such an incompatibility. Finding this number, we have revealed a class of economies for which the sets of
envy-free, and eﬃcient and envy-free allocations coincide.
Further, we have proved that in two-agent economies, independently of an agent’s preferences, the rank of
the worst bundle of the allocations eﬃciency and minimization of inequality among equals recommend when
each other agent has her preferences, equals 2a 1, hence it has a closed-form expression. In economies with
more than two agents, it may vary along with preferences and we fear computational complexity. We have
proved that 5 is the smallest a for there to be such a situation. We leave for further research the study of the
unanimity bound in such economies and possibly, the computational complexity pertaining to it, hence the
one pertaining to determining if a rule, as the maximin rule, satisﬁes it. We have given a necessary condition
for unanimity bound avoiding such possible complexity.
Our results strengthen the known gap between two-agent economies and those with more than two. We
fear it implies an incompatibility between eﬃciency and fairness axioms we imposed, in the latter economies.
The maximin rule does not satisfy eﬃciency in such economies. By opposition, the leximin rule and the
rule selecting for each R 2 RN, each x 2 P(R) \  (R),13 satisfy eﬃciency. They satisfy anonymity and
neutrality. They may satisfy the unanimity bound, and the latter preference-monotonicity. As they coincide
with the maximin rule in R0 of Ex. 3, they violate conditional no-envy.
Incompatibility between avoiding envy and caring for the least fortunates seems inexorable in economies
with more than two agents, irrespective of how one formulates the latter. There are economies with n = 3
and a = 6, preference proﬁles, and allocations with for each preference proﬁle in which the agents keep
these preferences over singletons, these are envy-free allocations, but each Borda maximin allocation implies
envy for at least one such proﬁle (Brams et al., 2003). If n > 2 and there is q 2 N with qn = a, there are
preferences proﬁles with a Borda maximin allocation that is eﬃcient for at least one preference proﬁle in
which the agents keep these preferences over singletons, ensuring envy, i.e. for each such proﬁle (Brams and
King, 2005).
We have proved that one may avoid this incompatibility in two-agents economies. Yet, one must be
careful formulating the latter. Assume that there is q 2 N with qn = a. There are preferences proﬁles
with a maximin allocation that is eﬃcient for at least one preference proﬁle in which the agents keep these
preferences over singletons, ensuring envy. This holds for Borda maximin allocations only if q = 1. (Brams
and King, 2005). Yet, it does not mean that even if possible, such allocations are envy-free, as opposed to the
allocations the maximin rule selects. Further, we have proved that there is more behind compatibility, in the
sense, avoiding envy, together with other fairness fundamentals, induce one to care for the least fortunates.
If indeed eﬃciency and fairness axioms we imposed, are incompatible in economies with more than
two agents, one should diﬀerentiate classes, and perhaps, focus on rules that fairly allocate goods in each
economy rather than on those that avoid envy in a limited number of them. One might then determine if
these fundamentals, and which of them, also induce one to care for the least fortunates in such economies.
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18Notes
1 Descending Demand Procedure: Order the set of agents. Each agent, one after the other w.r.t. the order, gives her most
preferred subset. If we get an allocation accordingly, stop; if not, continue. Each agent, one after the other w.r.t. the order,
gives her second most preferred subset. (...) Stop when for the ﬁrst time, we get an allocation from the bundles given up to here.
Each eﬃcient allocation among the allocations we get accordingly, is a solution of the procedure. In each economy, possibly
with more than two agents, each allocation it yields is one the maximin rule selects. One considers reﬁnements to explicitly ﬁnd
eﬃcient allocations in more-than-two-agent economies or if possible, secure avoiding envy in two-agent economies, in which
preferences reveal complementarities (Herreiner and Puppe, 2002).
2 For a general review, see Brams (2006).
3 Procedures one relies on to get the allocations rules select, use such preferences as informational inputs (Brams and Fishburn,
2000; Herreiner and Puppe, 2002). To obtain these, one may face practical issues. The number of subsets of goods may be
large, over a million if n = 20 (Brams et al., 2003; Brams and King, 2005). Yet, if preferences are additively separable, one may
ask for cardinal information over goods to extract the needed ordinal information over subsets. The use of point assignments,
which need not perfectly mirror an agent’s utility, as in ﬁne one only uses ordinal information, solves the tractability issue
surely for n up to 30 or so (Brams and Fishburn, 2000). Besides, agents may behave strategically giving the information, and
possibly falsify their preferences in view of welfare gains. Yet, it would require remarkable knowledge of the others’ preferences
and computational ability, hence procedures could be immune from such strategic manipulation (Brams and Fishburn, 2000;
Herreiner and Puppe, 2002; Brams et al., 2009).
4 Solutions to problems with one or two goods are obvious. In the former case, eﬃciency requires to give the good, and
anonymity requires to give the agents equal chance of being the “lucky" one. In the latter case, other fairness axioms that are
vacuously satisﬁed in the former case, become compelling. These problems amounts to three cases. One easily extends our
results to these. To avoid unnecessary notational diﬃculty, we do not study them explicitly.
5 Pt. 4 is a notable property of complements due to the order, desirability, and independence assumptions. Indeed, if (i) Ri
on S is a weak order; (ii) for each S 2 S, if S 6= ;, then S Pi ;; and (iii) for each S;T;T0 2 S, if S \ T0 = T \ T0 = ;, then
S [ T0 Pi T [ T0 if and only if S Pi T, then (iv) for each S;T 2 S, we have S Ri T if and only if Tc Ri Sc (Fishburn, 1970).
Unless a  4, (i), (ii), (iii), and (v) Ri on S is a linear order w.r.t singletons, are not suﬃcient for additive separability (Kraft
et al., 1959).
6 Each agent getting an empty bundle is always envy-free. Regarding “no allocation" as a potential solution to allocation
problems seems absurd. In any case, by desirability, eﬃciency precludes it. To avoid unnecessary notational diﬃculty, we
explicitly do not include it in X.
7 Proof available upon request.
8 Then, R
j weakly closer to Ri than R0
j if and only if the Kemeny distance (Kemeny and Snell, 1962) between R
j and Ri is
less than the one between on R0
j and Ri. Geometrically, there are u;u0;u 2  with the associated real-valued function ﬁtting
Ri, R0
j, and R
j resp. and the number of hyperplanes between u and u less than the one between u0 and u.
9 Bouveret and Lang (2008) study the problem of determining the existence of eﬃcient and envy-free allocations from compact
representation and computational complexity viewpoints. Demko and Hill (1998) prove the computational complexity of the
problem of determining if allocations maximizing, across allocations, the minimal utility, across agents, of an allocation, equating
the agents’ utilities of the subset containing all goods to 1, are such that each agent’s utility of her bundle is at least (1=n),
i.e. at least NP-complete. Such a constraint does not deﬁne a lower bound, in the sense, one may only secure it in a limited
number of economies. Further, it requires more than ordinal information on preferences.
10 For each x 2 X, each R 2 RN, and each q 2 f1;:::;ng, let r(x;R;1)  mini2N ri(xi), ..., r(x;R;q) 
mini2Nnfj2N: there is p2f1;:::;q 1g with rj(xj)=r(x;R;q)g ri(xi). For each R 2 RN, we have (R) = fx 2 X : there is
q 2 f1;:::;n   1g with x 2 \q2f1;:::qg argmaxy2X r(y;R;q) and argmaxy2X r(y;R;q) = argmaxy2X r(y;R;q + 1)g.
11 The deterministic-distribution value solution corresponds to rules selecting balanced divisions (Demko and Hill, 1998).
Equimax divisions are the lexicographic extension of maxmin divisions (Brams et al., 2003; Brams and King, 2005).
12 Brams and Fishburn (2000) prove the implication under the assumptions of Footn. 3. Edelman and Fishburn (2001) leave
open the question of how small a may be for the incompatibility to be, but conjecture 9. If n = 2, w.l.o.g. N = f1;2g, for
each R;R0 2 RN with R0
1 = R1 and R0
2 closer to R1 than R2, we have F(R)  F(R0), P(R)  P(R0), PF(R)  PF(R0),
PF(R)  PF(R0), or both, if a = 3, then PF(R)  PF(R0). Proof available upon request.
13 This rule selects the allocations Herreiner and Puppe (2002) deﬁne as balanced.
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